WHAT DID I LEARN ABOUT JUDICIARY AND EXECUTIVE

Lisää tämän kaltaisia

Government in Canada Unit 2 Assignment

luonut ryankakakakakakakak sanglakhi

Does bilinguals different language usage cause measurable changes in the shifting aspects of executive function?

luonut karen maria angelica peña cardenas

The Development of English-French Relations in Canada

luonut Japmeet Singh - Rick Hansen SS (2542)

Uruguay

luonut QIAN ZHANG

WHAT DID I LEARN ABOUT JUDICIARY AND EXECUTIVE

JUDICIARY

MUST NOT INTERFERE THE SHARIAH COURT'S JURISDICTION

THIS CAN BE SEEN DUE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTICLE 121 (1A)

CASES THAT WE CAN SEE

SUBASHINI RAJASINGAM V SARAVANA THANGATHORAY

MEOR ATIQULRAHMAN V FATIMAH SIHI

HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE

CAN BE SEEN IN THE CASES LIKE DATUK HARUN V PP, DATO' MENTERI OTHMAN BAGINDA V DATO' SYED ALWI SYED IDRUS, KAMARIAH ALI V KERAJAAN NEGERI KELANTAN AND ETC

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

IT IS NOT COMPULSORY TO REFER TO FOREIGN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS

MUST BE PAR TO MALAYSIA

MUST INTERPRET THE LAW WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTION

HAVE THE SECURITY OF THE JUDICIAL TENURE

THE TENURE OF THE JUDICIAL PART CAN ONLY BE DISCUSSED THE PARLIAMNET BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE MOTION SUPPORTED BY THE QUARTER OF THE HOUSE

THIS CAN BE SEEN IN THE ARTICLE 125

THE JUDICIARY HAS A FORM OF GUARANTEES AGAINST PACKING

JUDICIARY(NOT EXECUTIVE) WILL DECIDE ABOUT WHO IS GOING TO HEAR THE CASE AND IT MUST

THIS IS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE EXECUTIVE DOES NOT INTERFERE MUCH IN THE JUDICIARY

JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

THIS CAN BE SEEN IN THE ARTICLE 122B

THIS INCLUDES THE APPOINTMENT OF

JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

THE CHIEF JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

CHIEF JUSTICE F THE FEDERAL COURT

THE POWERS AND DUTIES

ADJUCATES THE DISPUTES BETWEEN

THE STATE AND THE FEDERATION

THE STATES

THE CITIZENS AND THE ORGANS OF STATE

THE CITIZENS

EXECUTIVE

CABINET

THE CABINET MAY RESIGN R DISMMISSED

MAY BE DISMISSED FROM THE OFFICE

MAY RESIGN AT ANY TIME

RESPONSIBILITIES

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

ANSWERABILITY TO MONARCH

SECRECY

MAINTAINING CONFIDENCE

UNAMINITY

PARLIAMENTARY EXECUTIVE

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES

VOTE OF CENSURE

LEGISLATION

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MONARCH'S ACT

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

POLICY CULPABILITY

CAN BE APPOINTED OF EITHER HOUSE OF SENATES OR HOUSE OD REPRESENATATIVES

THE MEMBERS OF CABINET IS APPOINTED BY THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG BASED ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS

YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG

HE HAS 3 TYPES OF POWERS

RESIDUAL POWER

THIS POWER IS A DISCRETIONARY POWER THAT ARE BASED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

RIGHT TO DISMISS THE PRIME MINISTER

BY EXTRANEOUS FACTOR

BY EXTERNAL FACTOR

RIGHT TO AWARD HONOURS

RIGHT TO BE CONSULTED

NON-DISCRETIONARY POWER

THIS MEANS THAT THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG MUST ACT ACCORDINGLY TO THE ADVICE THAT HE RECEIVED

EXAMPLE

THE APPOINTMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES

THIS CAN BE SEEN I THE ARTICLE 40(1) OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

DISCRETIONARY POWER

THIS MEANS THAT THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG USES HIS MIND TO EXERCISE THE POWER GIVEN TO HIM

EXAMPLES

HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPOINT THE CARE TAKER OF THE GOVERNMENT WHEN IN A DISSOLUTION OF THE PARLIAMENT

REFUSING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PARLIAMENT

THIS CAN BE SEEN IN THE ARTICLE 40(2) OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

THIS MEANS THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG ONLY REIGNS BUT DOES NOT RULE

YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG IS A HEAD OF STATE

PUBLIC SERVICE BASED ON ARTICLE 132 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

THE JOINT PUBLIC SERVICE(ARTICLE 133 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION)

PUBLIC SERVICE OF EACH STATE

GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE FEDERATION

JUDICIAL AND LEGAL SERVICE

THE POLICE FORCE

EDUCATION SERVICE

ARMED FORCE

PRIME MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER MAY BE DISMISSED

IF THE PRIME MINISTER REFUSED TO RESIGN, THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGOMG

THE PRIME MINISTER CAN BE DISMISSED BY VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE OR WHEN HE LOSES THE MAJORITY CONFIDENCE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THE PRIME MINSTER MAY RESIGN BY GIVING A RESIGNATION TO THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG

THE PRIME MINISTER NEEDS THE MAJORITY CONFIDENCE BY THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THIS CAN BE COMPARED AND RATIONALIZED IN THE CASE OF TUN DATU HAJI MUSTAPHA BIN DATU HARUN v TUN DATUK HAJI MOHAMED ADNAN ROBERT

THE PRIMEMINISTER MUST COME FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THE PRIME MINISTER CAN BE APPOINTED BY THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG AS STATED IN THE ARTICLE 43 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

THE FIRST ROLE OF A PRIME MINISTER IS TO BE THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT